"A young boy who had become addicted to smoking marihuana cigarettes ... seized an ax and killed his father, mother, two brothers, and a sister." Harry J. Anslinger, Commissioner of Narcotics, Additional Statement for the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.
Introduction
There is a strong correlation between marijuana use and criminal activity (Bennett, Holloway, and Farrington 2008) , and marijuana is the drug most commonly detected among arrestees. 1 This association is one reason that the U.S. Federal
Government continues to classify marijuana as a Schedule I drug (Drug Enforcement Administration 2011). However, the causal evidence on the effects of marijuana use on crime is limited and inconclusive (Adda, McConnell, and Rasul 2014; Braakmann and Jones 2014; Fergusson and Horwood 1997; Green et al. 2010; Markowitz 2005; Norström and Rossow 2014; Pacula and Kilmer 2003) .
Since 1996, most U.S. states and the District of Columbia have legalized medical marijuana. A medical marijuana law protects patients whose marijuana use has been recommended by a doctor from being convicted of marijuana possession. Several recent studies have shown that medical marijuana laws cause a 10-20% increase in marijuana use, concentrated among heavy users and older adults (Chu 2014 (Chu , 2015 Hasin et al. 2017; Martins et al. 2016; Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings 2015) .
Somewhat surprisingly, there is little evidence that medical marijuana laws have increased marijuana use among adolescents. (For a review of the literature, see Sarvet et al. (2018) .) A growing literature evaluating whether medical marijuana laws affect health and social outcomes has found that medical marijuana laws reduce drunk driving, heroin usage, opioid addiction, obesity, suicide, and time spent on study (Anderson, Hansen, and Rees 2013; Anderson, Rees, and Sabia 2014; Chu 2015; Chu and Gershenson 2016; Powell, Pacula, and Jacobs 2015; Sabia, Swigert, and Young 2017) .
There are several channels through which medical marijuana laws could affect crime. The increase in marijuana use could decrease crime rates because marijuana use directly reduces aggression and violence (Miczek et al. 1994) . However, the long-run neuropsychological effects of marijuana could harm the brain, causing violent behaviors (Boles and Miotto 2003; Hoaken and Stewart 2003; Macleod et al. 2004 ;
The studies estimating the effects of medical marijuana laws on crime have found mixed results (Alford 2014; Gavrilova, Kamada, and Zoutman 2018; Huber, Newman, and LaFave 2016; Morris et al. 2014) . For example, Huber, Newman, and LaFave (2016) find a 15-20% decrease in both violent and property crimes, while Morris et al. (2014) report small and insignificant estimates. Gavrilova, Kamada, and Zoutman (2018) find a 12% reduction in violent crimes in the three medical marijuana states bordering to Mexico and insignificant changes elsewhere.
Given the mixed results in the literature it is unclear whether medical marijuana laws affect crime rates. One limitation of the existing literature is that it relies on the state or county level crime data from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), which contain substantial measurement error. Because participation in the UCR program is generally voluntary, and many police agencies do not report every year, the composition of reporting agencies in each state or county is not constant over time. Another limitation is that some states exhibit strong distinctive trends in crime, suggesting that the parallel trend assumption required in difference-in-difference regression may be unjustified. A third limitation is that medical marijuana laws differ, and as such may have heterogeneous effects (Anderson and Rees 2014; Pacula, Boustead, and Hunt 2014; Pacula et al. 2015) . One important implication of heterogeneous effects is that, as the existing studies often use state populations to weight their regressions, their results could be driven by a few large states (Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2015) .
In this paper we estimate the causal effects of medical marijuana laws on violent and property crimes using the UCR offense data for the years 1988-2013. To minimize measurement error, we use agency-level data from cities of more than 50,000 city residents, with whom the FBI communicates regularly (Akiyama and Propheter 2005) .
We first apply a difference-in-difference research design implemented by a linear regression model which controls for city fixed effects and flexible city-specific time trends. We then use the synthetic control method which can nonparametrically control for pre-law differences in crime trends and thus can relax the parallel trend assumption (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010, 2011) . The synthetic control method can also investigate treatment effect heterogeneity by estimating causal effects within individual cities or states. We apply the synthetic control method at the city level to be consistent with the regression analysis and to minimize measurement error. We obtain synthetic controls for each medical marijuana city and calculate difference-indifference estimates of medical marijuana laws' effect in each city. To obtain the aggregate effects, we first average city-level estimates to obtain the state-level estimated effects of each medical marijuana law then average state-level effects to the national level. Since we are mainly interested in the state or national average effects of medical marijuana laws, we implement a generalized placebo method proposed by Cavallo et al. (2013) to perform statistical inference on these average estimates.
Both the regression analysis and the synthetic control find no substantial changes -positive or negative -in either violent or property crime after the passage of medical marijuana laws. Most of the regression estimates are small and insignificant.
The estimates are somewhat sensitive to model specifications of the city-specific time trends, suggesting that the parallel trend assumption presumed in the existing literature may be failing. The estimated effects also appear to be somewhat heterogeneous across states: the signs of the estimates change when California is excluded from the sample.
The results from the synthetic control method are broadly consistent with the regression analysis but are more robust and precisely estimated. At the national level, both before and after the passage of medical marijuana laws, the violent and property crime rates in the medical marijuana states are nearly identical to those in their synthetic controls, suggesting medical marijuana laws had no effect. The difference-in-difference estimates derived from the synthetic control are very small and are statistically insignificant: they indicate only a 3.7% decrease in violent crime and a 1.5% increase in property crimes.
We also use the synthetic control method to investigate the effects of medical marijuana laws on specific crimes: murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, This paper resolves the discrepancies in the existing literature and addresses an important policy issue -medical marijuana laws' effects on crime -using both a traditional regression analysis and a nonparametric method, the synthetic control. In evaluating these laws we also provide plausible evidence on the causal relationship between marijuana use and criminal activity. Perhaps because marijuana use among adolescents, the age group with a higher risk of committing crimes, remain unchanged (Sarvet et al. 2018) , or because the marijuana black market generates little violence (Caulkins and Pacula 2006; Reuter 2009 ), we do not find that medical marijuana legalization affect crime. As the legalization of recreational marijuana becomes increasingly popular, the lack of a positive causal effect of marijuana use on crime may ease public concerns.
The paper proceeds as follows: Sections 2 and 3 describe the medical marijuana laws and the UCR data. Section 4 presents the results from the regression models, and Section 5 presents the results from the synthetic control method. Section 6 concludes.
Medical Marijuana Laws
As between true zeros and missing data, we make two assumptions. First, we assume zeros for total violent crime or total property crime in our sample represent missing data -a reasonable assumption for these relatively large cities. Second, we assume zeros in each crime category are true zeros when the total violent or property crime count is not zero.
As nearly all of the zeros come from the most severe violent crime -murder -these zeros are unlikely to be missing data.
In the UCR offense data there are four categories of violent crimes -murder, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault -and four categories of property crimes -burglary, larceny theft, motor vehicle theft and arson. We exclude arson because the arson data is very incomplete. We sum over the other categories to obtain the total violent and property crime rates per 100,000 city residents which will be our main focus in the paper. We merge the offense data with police officer counts from the UCR Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted series. The final panel consists of 18,607 6 The UCR offense data only indicates the month of the last report, but it does not necessarily mean that the agency reports every month prior to the last reported month. We exclude 321 observations for which the last reported month is not December. 7 We focus on cities and exclude counties. Among agencies in metropolitan statistical areas with more than 50,000 residents about 70% of the population lives in cities. 8 We also exclude one city in Alaska, Fairbank, which experienced a fast drop in population and a surge in crime. Fairbank has a population of only roughly 30,000 since 1990 and data quality is often a concern in small cities. Table A1 .
Regression Analysis

Model
We first implement a difference-in-difference research design by estimating the following linear model using OLS:
in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of the violent or property crime rate in city i, state s and year t. MMLst is a binary indicator equal to one if state s had a medical marijuana law in effect in year t and zero otherwise. Xist is a vector of timevarying city and state characteristics including log agency population, log agency police officer counts, log state unemployment rates, and dummy variables for marijuana decriminalization and marijuana legalization. 9 θi and δt are city and year fixed effects, fit(t) is a city-specific time trend with a linear, quadratic or cubic functional form, and εist is the idiosyncratic error term. The parameter of interest is β, the causal effect of state medical marijuana laws on log crime rates. Abadie et al. (2017) suggest that clustering should be treated as an issue of research design. As medical marijuana laws are determined at the state level, the estimated standard errors allow within-state clustering. Table 2 presents estimated effects of medical marijuana laws on total violent crime. In column (1), which displays results controlling for linear city-specific time 9 States that decriminalize marijuana possession in our sample period are California ( trends, the estimate is very close to zero. In column (2), in which we control for quadratic trends, the estimate becomes statistically significant at the 5% level and indicates that medical marijuana laws cause a 4.7% decrease in violent crime rates. In column (3), in which we control for cubic trends, the point estimate changes little but its estimated standard error grows and as such it loses its significance.
Results
The policy indicator MMLst varies at the state level while each observation is a city-year. As such, one concern is that the estimates in columns (1) - (3) could be driven by a few populous states with many cities. 10 To illustrate this problem we report estimates in columns (4) - (6) in which the largest state, California, is omitted from the sample. Unlike the estimates in columns (1) - (3), the estimates in columns (4) - (6) are small and insignificant, suggesting no causal relationship between medical marijuana laws and violent crime. While the estimates in columns (4) - (6) are all close to zero, the remaining differences between them demonstrate their sensitivity to the functional form of the city-specific time trends, suggesting that the parallel trend assumption may not be justified. In columns (7) - (9) we aggregate the data to the state level and re-estimate the model to obtain an average estimated effect -that is, one in which each medical marijuana state receives equal weight regardless of its number of cities. These regressions are more consistent with the underlying research design because medical marijuana laws vary at the state level. Similar to columns (4) - (6), all of the estimates in columns (7) - (9) are statistically insignificant and are quite sensitive to time tend specifications. That the estimates in latter columns differ from those in columns (1) - (3) suggests that state-specific effects of medical marijuana laws on violent crime are somewhat heterogeneous. 11 As most existing studies use populationweighted regressions or less aggregated data in which the number of observations is larger in more populous states, as is the case in the regressions reported in columns (1) - (3), their negative effects may be driven by large states like California.
12 Table 3 presents estimated effects on property crime. The city-level estimates including California (columns (1) - (3)) are negative but small and insignificant. However, the city-level estimates excluding California (columns (4) - (6)) are positive and statistically significant, suggesting a 3.8-6.2% increase in property crime rates.
The state-level estimates in columns (7) - (9) are also positive though they are not statistically significant. The difference in the estimated effects between the city-level regression and state-level regression again seems to be mainly due to the weighting of California. Unlike the estimates for violent crime, the estimates for property crime are less sensitive to the time trend specification.
We do not find evidence that medical marijuana laws consistently affect violent and property crimes. We use agency-level data from relatively large cities and thus our results should be less sensitive to measurement error than previous studies which use aggregate state or county level data. However, the results still appear to be somewhat sensitive to time trend specifications and to the implicit weight given to each medical marijuana state. The mixed findings in previous studies are likely due to heterogeneity in the medical marijuana laws' effects or to the failure of the parallel trend assumption.
In the Appendix Tables A2 and A3 , we replace the policy indicator MMLst with a set of dummy variables that indicate each year before (Year -1 to Year -5) and after (Year 0 to Year 7+) the passage of medical marijuana laws to estimate dynamic effects of these laws on violent and property crimes. The estimates for pre-law dummies Year -1 to Year -5 are often large and statistically significant especially when California is included in the sample, suggesting that violent and property crimes in medical marijuana states and non-medical marijuana states exhibit distinct trends and thus the parallel trend assumption required by the difference-in-difference design may not be valid. In the next section, we apply the synthetic control method which can address these concerns.
Synthetic Control Analysis
Methodology
The synthetic control method compares a treated unit to its synthetic control: a weighted average of units from a potential control group (the "donor pool") with weights chosen to minimize pre-treatment differences between the treated unit and the synthetic control (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010, 2011; Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003) . The synthetic control provides the best available counterfactual to the treated unit because the synthetic control is constructed to match the treated unit as closely as possible. 13 The synthetic control method can be viewed as a generalization of difference-in-difference research design: a fixed effects regression with a single treatment unit is equivalent to a synthetic control which places equal weight on all units from the control group. Unlike regression analysis that can only control for time trends using parametric functional forms, the synthetic control method can nonparametrically remove pre-existing trends. Moreover, as the synthetic control method constructs the optimal control for each treated unit, it can better estimate (potentially heterogeneous)
state-specific treatment effects.
We use the synthetic control method to estimate the causal effects of medical marijuana laws on violent and property crimes. In addition to the dependent variable, log violent or property crime rates, we use log police officer counts and log city populations (for each pre-treatment year) to fit the synthetic control. Each treated unit is a city from a medical marijuana state and the donor pool consists of cities from states without an effective medical marijuana law in 2013. Units in the synthetic control's donor pool need to form a balanced panel without missing data. To retain a large, balanced donor pool we implement the synthetic control method using a 15-year interval -7 years before and after (the first full year of) the implementation of a law.
We require each treated city to have at least 5 years of non-missing pre-treatment data.
315 treated cities are retained. As the medical marijuana laws were passed in different years, treated cities' donor pools differ. , and repeating one million times. 17 The one-sided and two-sided p-values are defined as for the national average.
Results
Figures 1 and 2 present graphical evidence of medical marijuana laws' effects on log violent crime rates and log property crime rates, with 0 on the x-axis denoting the first full year of the law being effective, -1 to -7 denoting the pre-treatment period in which the synthetic control is fitted and 1 to 7 denoting the post-treatment period.
To create the data in Figures 1 and 2 we first obtain the synthetic control for each medical marijuana city. Data for treated cities and for their synthetic controls are 16 We randomly sample placebo states rather than calculate the average for all permutations of placebo states k and medical marijuana laws s, as the total number of such permutations is k s ≈ 10 27 . 17 As Montana only has two cities in the sample, we use all available ̅ to form the placebo distribution as the total number of possible ̅ is less than one million. 18 Because the data are averaged first then differenced, the aggregate estimates reported in Figures 1 and  2 are slightly different from the average estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5 in which the data are differenced first then averaged. The aggregate estimates in Figures 1 and 2 give more weights to states passing medical marijuana laws earlier. In contrast, the average estimates in Tables 4 and 5 for city i in state s, where t = 0, 1, …, 7. As in Figures 1 and 2 , only states which have had an effective medical marijuana law for at least t years contribute to the estimate for Year t. Tables 4 and 5 Table 4 and an average effect of 1.5% increase in property crime in Table 5 . However, in column (1) (column (2)) the two-sided (one sided) pvalues show that 23% (20%) of placebo estimates for violent crime and 41% (28%) of placebo estimates for property crime are greater than the actual MML estimates.
All of the estimates in
Therefore, there is no evidence that the estimates are drawn from a different distribution from the placebo effects. Most of the estimates for specific years are also close to zero and not statistically significant. At the national level, the results from the synthetic control method strongly suggest medical marijuana laws do not affect crime, and they are roughly consistent with those from the state-level regression analysis.
One advantage of the synthetic control method and placebo inference is that it does not suffer the finite sample bias in fixed effects regression when the number treated units is small (see note 13). Therefore, the synthetic control method can estimate causal effects for individual treated units and thus detect heterogeneous treatment effects. We take (unweighted) averages from city-level estimates to obtain estimates in each medical marijuana state. Tables 6 and 7 Tables 6 and 7 and Appendix Tables A4 and A5 are quantitatively similar and consistent with there being little heterogeneity within states. (See also Note 11.)
In Table 7 , the estimate indicates a 23% decrease in total property crime rates in California after medical marijuana law passage. However, we find no comparable decrease in property crime rates in Washington or Oregon. In fact, in Table 7 , estimates for all states other than California have large p-values and are not statistically significant. There is no evidence that medical marijuana laws consistently affect property crime.
While some researchers suggest that the details of medical marijuana laws are important (Pacula, Boustead, and Hunt 2014; Pacula et al. 2015) , Overall, we find only a little heterogeneity in the effects of medical marijuana laws as most estimates are small. 22 The only notable exception is California which exhibits a significant decrease in both violent and property crime after the passage of medical marijuana law. In Figure 5 we plot the violent and property crime rates for California and its synthetic control before and after its medical marijuana law passage.
The violent and property crime rates in California substantially deviate from its synthetic controls. As California passed an amendment (Senate Bill 420) in 2004 that set up statewide guidelines for marijuana provision and also grants implied legal protection for marijuana dispensaries, we also plot violent and property crime rates before and after the 2004 amendment in Appendix Figure A1 ; the violent crime continues to decrease after the amendment while property crime remains similar to that in the synthetic control.
In summary, the results in Tables 6 and 7 indicate that violent and property crime rates in medical marijuana states are generally similar to those of their synthetic controls. The estimates tend to be negative for violent crime and positive for property crime but they mostly have small magnitudes and large p-values and are thus not statistically significant. In Figure 6 , the red lines indicate those 18 state-level estimates for medical marijuana laws reported in Table 6 and 7. Except for a few outliers, most of the state-level estimates are distributed around zero. The estimates for violent crime show more dispersion and are slightly more likely being negative than those for property crime. We also plot city-level estimates in blue bins in Figure 6 . The city-level estimates are distributed near zero but tend to be negative because 40% of cities are from California which experienced substantial decreases in both violent and property crime.
In Table 8 , we apply the synthetic control method to estimate the effects of medical marijuana laws on each category of crimes: murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. Because an agency may report zero incidence in one or more categories, the dependent variables are crime rates per 100,000 residents without taking logarithms. As in Tables 4 and 5, we calculate difference-in-difference estimates for each medical marijuana city using their synthetic controls and average city-level estimates to the state level and then the national level. 22 The aggregate figures for violent and property crime in each medical marijuana state and its synthetic control are available upon request. These figures show that violent and property crime rates in the synthetic controls move closely with the treatment group in most medical marijuana states.
We also report average crime rates before the enactment of medical marijuana laws for each crime.
In Table 8 , columns (1) - (4), all of the estimates for violent crimes are negative.
The estimate for murder indicates a decrease of 8.5% but is statistically insignificant.
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All other estimates are small and suggest only about 4 -5% decreases in forcible rape, robbery and aggravate assault. Only the estimate for robbery is marginally significant at 5% level (p-value = 0.046). For property crimes (columns (5) - (7)), the estimates for burglary and larceny are close to zero and statistically insignificant. However, medical marijuana laws appear to cause a sizeable increase in motor vehicle theft. The estimate is highly significant (p-value = 0.002) and indicates an 8.1% increase in motor vehicle theft. Overall, the synthetic control method finds no strong effect on crimes except for motor vehicle theft. 
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has attempted to resolve discrepancies in the existing literature evaluating medical marijuana laws' effects on crime. We first adopted the regression approach taken by the existing literature. To minimize measurement error we used agency-level data from cities with more than 50,000 residents. To loosen the parallel trends assumption we estimated regression models controlling for city-specific polynomial time trends. To allow for heterogeneous effects we estimated regressions at both the state level and the city level.
We found that these decisions matter. The specification of the city-specific trend changes the estimated effects on violent crime, and the high weight given to California by city-level regressions results in a significant estimated effect which is otherwise negligible. As such we complemented our regression model with a synthetic control model which can further loosen the parallel trends assumption and better estimate state-23 Carefully examining the data by state indicate that the large decrease in murder is due to an outlier, the District of Columbia, which has an estimate of a decrease of 11 murders per 100,000 residents. Excluding the District of Columbia results in a statistically insignificant estimate of only 0.08 decrease in murder per 100,000 (a 1.5% decrease) (not reported in the paper). The estimates for each crime by medical marijuana state are available upon request. 24 Appendix Figures A2 and A3 show the aggregate graph for each violent and property crime. Except for motor vehicle theft, all other violent and property crimes in medical marijuana states do not substantially deviate from those in the synthetic controls, suggesting that the effect of laws on crimes are small to none. As the differences in estimates between Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 4 and 5, because of the alternative order of taking difference and averaging, the average estimates in Table 8 reduction in both violent and property crimes.
As indicated by our opening quote, the criminalization of marijuana has always been motivated by the fear that marijuana causes criminality. As medical marijuana laws increase heavy marijuana use (Chu 2014; Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings 2015) , our null result suggests that even heavy medical marijuana use has a negligible effect on criminality. We also find no strong evidence that heavy marijuana users commit property crime to fund addictions. Our results suggest that liberalization of marijuana laws is unlikely to result in the substantial social cost from a surge in crime that some politicians clearly fear.
Nevertheless, we do not find the reduction in violent crime predicted by some medical marijuana proponents. This may be because the marijuana black market lacks the violence associated with the black markets for hard drugs ( Table 2 lists the estimated effects of medical marijuana laws on log violent crime rates, calculated using linear regressions. All specifications control for city (or state) and year fixed effects, log city (state) populations, log city (state) police officer rates, dummy variables for marijuana decriminalization and legalization, and log state unemployment rates. Robust standard errors allowing within-state clustering are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 3 lists the estimated effects of medical marijuana laws on log property crime rates, calculated using linear regressions. All specifications control for city (or state) and year fixed effects, log city (state) populations, log city (state) police officer rates, dummy variables for marijuana decriminalization and legalization, and log state unemployment rates. Robust standard errors allowing withinstate clustering are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 1 of Table 4 lists average differences between the log violent crime rates in states with medical marijuana laws and those of their synthetic controls, either over all years after the law was implemented (in row 1) or in particular years.
Other columns list p-values calculated using placebo estimates. The 1-sided p-values are the left-tail p-values when the estimate is positive and are the right-tail p-values when the estimate is negative. Column 1 of Table 5 lists average differences between the log property crime rates in states with medical marijuana laws and those of their synthetic controls, either over all years after the law was implemented (in row 1) or in particular years. Other columns list p-values calculated using placebo estimates. The 1-sided p-values are the left-tail p-values when the estimate is positive and are the right-tail p-values when the estimate is negative. The blue lines in Figure 3 represent histograms of placebo estimates of medical marijuana laws' effect on log violent crime rates, whereas the red line represents the actual estimate. In Panel A, all placebos are used, whereas in Panel B only the 75% of placebos with the least RMSPE are used. 2-sided p-values are calculated using these placebo estimates. The blue lines in Figure 4 represent histograms of placebo estimates of medical marijuana laws' effect on log property crime rates, whereas the red line represents the actual estimate. In Panel A, all placebos are used, whereas in Panel B only the 75% of placebos with the least RMSPE are used. 2-sided p-values are calculated using these placebo estimates. Figure 6 displays mean log crime rates per 100,000 residents for California and its synthetic control. The top panel presents log violent crime rates whereas the bottom presents log property crime rates. Table A2 lists effects of medical marijuana laws on log violent crime rates in years relative to the law's passage, calculated using linear regressions. All specifications control for city (or state) and year fixed effects, log city (state) populations, log city (state) police officer rates, dummy variables for marijuana decriminalization and legalization, and log state unemployment rates. Robust standard errors allowing within-state clustering are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Appendix Table A3 lists effects of medical marijuana laws on log property crime rates in years relative to the law's passage, calculated using linear regressions. All specifications control for city (or state) and year fixed effects, log city (state) populations, log city (state) police officer rates, dummy variables for marijuana decriminalization and legalization, and log state unemployment rates. Robust standard errors allowing within-state clustering are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Appendix Appendix Table A5 lists state average differences between the log violent crime rates of cities with medical marijuana laws and those of their synthetic controls. The p-values reported in the table are calculated using placebo estimates and are two-sided. The order of states is based on the year in which each state's medical marijuana law became legally effective. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
